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A SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION ANALYSIS
QF ADVERTISI~G, CONCENTRATION AND PROFITABILITY*

Nearly two decades of econometric research have·been completed in test1ng
.

.

i

.

relationships between industrial market structure and perfonnance.

Recently,

·re-examined these studies and cautioned on a number
a number of authors have·
.
.

.

'

.

of conceptual di.fficulties which subject the results and interpretation of
previous empirical work to question.

One primary cri ti ci sm of previous resea)ch
,·

has been .the failure to account for the simultaneous nature .of the interrelati'on
among elements of ind_ustry structure, conduct and performance[2, 4, 5, 11, 21,
24, 27).

While the. determinants of variables such as profits,advertising and

c~ncentration have been examined separately within the context of single equation
.

'

models, ,the underlying theory suggests -that these variables

a,re more

properly

considered as· jointly determi.ned within a system of simultaneous equatio_ns.
Under s~ch cir<:u111stances the potential of si-multaneous equation bias leads to·
problems f'egarding the interpretation of the results obtained using single
e~uation models.

In addition, it has been argued that·previous empirical studies

suffe_r due ·to the omission of certain critical variables from the specification
of structure-performance relationships.

First, the role of international trade

as an element of market structure has yet to be generally ·incorporated into
empirical studies, in, spite of recent theoretical work that has demonstrated its
potential importance [3, 19, 20].

A second type of omission has been the
'

'

~

,t

empirical neglect of inter-industry differentials in price elasticity of dem:~nd,
even though theoretical analysis clearly underscores the necessity of explicity
-

•s

•

e

'

accounting for demand elasticities, 'before any systematic rela:tionship between
a 'key structure element such as concentration and performance·can be inferred

t

[6,·7, .15, 22, 23].

2

It is the purpose bf this paper to examine the importance of the basic
empirical questions raised above. · A simultaneous equation model of three
..

i

important structure,· conduct, and performance variables (concentration,
advertising intensity, and profi,tability) is developed and estimated.

·•

The

model is further designed to incorporate and evaluate the importance of
international
trade considerations and differentials in price elasticiti'es
.
'
~

.

of demand in influencing industrial organization .relationships.
of the paper is as follows:

The organization

in Section I the.specification problems are

discussed in detail:' Section II describes the theoretical and empirical JnOdel.
In Section III the results of the estimation of the' model, applied to the U.S.
food processing sector, are presented.· Finally, the general conclusions of the
study are presented in Se.cti on IV.

(
'

3
..

I.

.

SPECIFICATION PROBLEMS IN PREVIOUS STUDIES

Simultaneity fo Industrial Organization Relationships
A large literature has already been-accumulated utilizing sing.le equation
techniques to test industrial organization hypotheses, but recent theoretical .
and empirical developments indicate that relationships between market_ structure,
conduct and performance should be cast·within a simultaneous equation framework. 1 ·
These studies sugge·st not only that market structure may influence con,duct and
perform?nce, but at the ~ame:; tiihe, market .conduct and performance are likely
to feedback and irifluence'market structure.

For example, _in most studies of

the rel atiqnshi p between
and profitability it
has been customary to
.
.... structure
.
'
'

.

incl~de- some measure of cidvertising inte·~sity as a structural variable. _This
follows the tradi_tional hypothesis that some combination of brand loyalty
induced by advertfsing and economies of scale ih advertising, re~ult in a.
product differentiation barrier to entry which allows established firms to
achieve and maintain higher profit rates~

The clear implication of this kind

oJ model is that advert.ising •intensity determines profitability [5, 9, 32].

Yet,-

recent theoretical work concerning optimal advertising strategy suggest

causation may run the other way· [24,_27]. 'That is, higher profit rates ihduce
greater advertising inte-nsity, since·, ceteris paribus, the higher the profit
'

.

.

rate per unit of sales, the more worthwhile it becomes to advertis·e in order
to capture an additional unit

of sales.

We are, therefore, confronted with two contrasting theoretical h,Ypotheses_:
that advertising leads to higher .profits and, in turn,-high profits lead to
more advertising.

But once it is recognized that the direction of causation may·

run both ways then any corre.lation obtained between profits and advertising
within a single equation model provides no information as to whether high
.

.

.

advertising creates high profits, high profits lead to high advertising or both
·1ines of causition occur si~ultaneously.

4
Similar problems 9f pqtential simultaneity exist in other industrial
brgani~ation relationships such as that between advertising and industry
)

.

concentration.

..

· ..

One line of reasoning suggest:S that concentration stimulates
i

advertising.

This argument
is based
Upon the presence
of advertising
.
;
.
.
.

ext~rnalities, where over-all industry demand along with demand for an
individual firm's product increase in response to advertising expenditures._
[5, ll, 27].

To the extent tha_t these_ externalities exist, higher levels

of concentration should gene~ate,highet levels of advertising since the
larger a firm 1 s market share; the greater the proportion of the external
industry effects and hence, the benefits of advertising, the firm is likely
to- be able to internalize.
'._,

A second view maintains that it is advertising which leads to increased
concentration [9, 14].

This conclusion is based on the existence of potentially
.

.

'

.

.

.

substantial economies of scale in advert,iing and the possibility that advertising
activity creates barriers to entry.

We a.re, therefore, confronted with the

expectation that concentration and advertising ;nay be casually interrelated;
and the difficulty of interpreting single equation correlations between the two.
The above arguments lead to the conclusion that_ three variables of
considerable· interest withi ~ the traditional structure-conduct-performance
.

.

paradigm (advertising, profits and concentrat,ion) shoul'id be vfewed as mutually
interdependent.

This implies that all three should be considered as jointly

determined endogehous variables wlthin a

system of simultaneous equations,

and that single equations models are i riappropri ate for hypotheses testing.

For

this reason we develop a thre_e equation model in which profits, concentration, and
advertising are considered jointly determined.· The model which is specified in
detail later takes the general form provided below:
(.I. l) .PMG = f( CR, AD, X)

(I.2)· AD
. ( I. 3)

CR

=
=

f( CR,, PMG, Y)
f ( AD , Z)

\
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where PMG ,is profita.bility, AD is advertising intensity, CR is seller concentratioH
and X, Y, and .Z are vectors of ex()goneous variables.

Price El as ti city

of Demand_

In addition to the problems relating to the simultaneity in structure,_
conduct, and performance., re 1ationshi ps, a number of other speci fi cation ,
improvements have recent,ly been suggested.

One of the most important of

.

these is .the accounting for
inter-industry differentials in price elasticity
.
of demand in structure-profits equations [5, 6, 7, 22, 23].
Virt1.i'ally all prior empirical studies of the relationship .between market
-

.

-

structure and. profit!:-have neglected the ~kistence of inter-industry differentials
'
.

.._

~

.

'

.

in .price elasticity of demand and tlie role of demand elasticity as a structural
2
variable.
This'omission, however, is not justified by either the underlying
theoretical models, or the available e~pirical ev~dence [1, 10].

The.theoretical

importance of price elasticity of demand tan be clarified by reference to the
famil~r_profi~_ m~ximi~i!!_g pr_t!=e:~IT!arginal cost relationship
(L4)

p.:.Mc

=1
nf

p

where nf is the P:ice elasticity of deniand for the firm's product.

If, as is

commonly assumed, concentration facilitates collective action by firms and
yields cartel-like pricing, ,then it is easy to show that the elasticity of
"

·-

'

.

'

"

demand ·for the k largest firms (nk), and hence the profit maximiiing pricerriarginal cost spread, depends_upon the market price elasticity of demand (nm),
the share of the ~arket control led by the k largest firms (Sk) and th.e output
,

response of rivals to the k largest firms pricing decisions (Er). - Let Qk' Qm,
and Qr represent the .levels of the k largest .firms output, market output and

6

rivals output respectively.

Then elasticity of demarid facing the k largest

firms is

.

If Sk and Srrepreserit tHe m~rket shares'of the k leadfo9 firms' and their rivals,
dQ

·.

. and E~ is defined as ·(d.PrH,f)
r

then (I.5) above can be expressed as

Substituting now expression (1.6) into (1~4) we obtain the profit maximizing
pdce-marginal cost relationship for the k largest firms 3 ·

(I.7)

P - MC

p

1
. =~

. sk
=

nm + Er ( 1 -. sk )

Equation (L7) provides a clear implication for the likely empiri'cal
relationship between measures of concentration (Sk) .and profitability.
Specifically, it indicates that one should not expect to isolate a systematic
relationship bet""e~n concentration ratios and profits, unless the market price
elasticity of demand across all industriesstudied is identical.

Since available

empirical evidence would indicate this is not the case, the omission of price
elasticity of demand variables in cross-section profitability studies results in
•

'

I

•

'

improperly specified models ..
Even apart from the purely theoretica 1 mode 1' ·presented above, price
ela_sticity of. demand should reinforce sorhe of the non-competitive aspects of

7

market structure as they. are conventionally measured.

For example,'while it is

true that any firm must consider the reaction of rivals to its price cuts/the
.

.

.

.

potential risk associated with price experimentation is smaller in industries
with price elastic demcmd, since overall industry sales would be expected ~o
significantly increase even if rivals ultimately follow suit.

Thus, given the

level of concentration, the degree of finn interdependence and the ability to
maintain

tacit price agreements is likely to be higher in industries with

relatively price inelastic demand.

Finally, any entry barriers a~tributable·

to economies of s~ale beco~~ more critical at a lower percentage ofind~stry
output, as market de!lland· becomes more .inelastic.
Thus, price elasticity_of demand is a theoretically important stru~tural
variab·l_e and1 particularly so, in studies of the relation between profits and
concentration.

Impo.rt Competition; ExporUng arid Industry, Profitability
Finally, recent theoretical and empirical results [3, 19, 20] indicate
that improvements in specifi.catfon can be realized by explicitly incorporating
foreign trade variables in structure-profit models.

For example, the market power

usually associated with highly concentrated industries can be seriously overstated
if firms in these industries face significant degrees of actual or potential
import competition.

In effect, import competition increases the number of fi nris

within an industry and dilutes the degree of domestic seller concentration.
C

Therefore, given any level of domestic concentrati.on, prices and profits o_ught
to be Closer' to competitive levels in industries facing close competit'ion from
fprei gn suppliers.

8

Exporting should als·o affect the performance of firms in the domestic
market, but no unambiguous relationship tan be theoretically derived.

Caves [3]

has shown that for a monopolist who is unable to price discriminate inter ...
nationally', the existence of export markets can result in domesti.c pricing
outcomes which _are cl.oser to competitive.levels.

He. has further argued that

this result is equally plausible in the context of oligopoly, since expansion
into foreign markets may render sellers less conscious of their mutual inter-.
dependence in the domesti.c market.

The implication of this argument is that

given the conditions. of domestic market structure such as the degree of seller
concentration, those industries relyi. ng more heavily upon foreign markets for
sales should experience lower profitability.

This·argument,.however, needs

modification if domestic firms are able to engage in international price
· discrimination.

Under this condition, and assuming the likely case of a more

elastic demand in the
foreign market, then those industries which have expanded
.
/

into export markets will experience higher rather than lower profits.
(

Since industries differ in respect to the importance of import
competition and the extent to which they export, :any empirical analysis which
includes only domestic elements of market structure provides an incomplete
representation of market conditions within industries.·

9.
II.

THE MODEL

In this section the .simultaneous equation model presented earlier
(equations (I.l),

(I.2)

and

(I.l) )

is s~ecifi~d in detaili

The price

- elasticity of demand and international trade variables are included along
/ with·other:exogenous variables to explain concentration, profits, and
advertising;
The Concentration Equation.
A large number of factors have been cited as influencing the observed
d~gree of concentration within an industry.

The most prevalent hypotheses.

suggest that concentration depends critically upon the number of firms in
the industry, .optimal firm size in relation to the size of the ma'rket (i.e.
the extent of economies of scale), and the ·degree of barriers to entry. 4 ·
Therefore, in explaining the ~our-firm seller concentration ratio (CR) the
' i

first \/ariable included in the equation was the number of firms in each·
industry (NF).,·
Since most scale economies iri production are apparently obtained at the
plant level, a variable measuring plant s6ale economies was utilized in the
concentration equation (ESD).

This is a dummy variable based upon the familar

Commanor and Wilson [5] measure of the average plant size among the largest
plants accounting for 50% of industry output divided by total industry output.
Industries with scale economies above the average for the sample were assigned a
'

value.of one, while those be.low were assigned a value of zero.

'

The dummy

variable as opposed to the actual number was utilized fn order to minimize the
spurious correlation which arises between this variable ·and the concentration
ratio. 5

lo
Two additional variables were included in the equation in order to
account for potential barriers

t,o entry arising from either advertising

intensity or high ·capital req1,1i~ments.

The advertising intensity variable- was

the advertising to sales ratio (Ad/S) for each industry in the sample.

The

height of capital requirements (KR) was measured as ·the dollar value of gross
fixed assets required by a plant of minimum efficient size.
The resulting concentration equation with the expect~d signs indicated
below is explanatory variable is thus: 6
(ILl)

CR= f

The Profit
Equation·.
.
.

(KR,. Ad/S, ESD, NF

1

+

+

+

)

.

.

The measure of prpfitabi 1i ty in .the profit equation was the price_cos t margin (P~G) J

. The

choice of the margin as the profit variable was

. predicated upon a number of factors.

First, sinceit approximates a rate

of retur~ on sal.es measure, it constitutes the profit concept which according
to theory should be directly related to price elasticity of demand and
advertising ip_tensity. · Moreover, it can be estimated directly _from Census
data at the four-di gft level, thus avoiding

a number

of aggregration and

accoundng probl~ms which arise when using either Internal Revenue Service
or individual firni data. 8 ·
Since gross capital costs are included in the margin, it is necessary
.

.

to include a variable which accounts and corrects for differences· in capital
intensity across i ndus tries.

The capital output r.ati o ( K/S}, measured. _as the.

book value of depreciable assets divided by value of shipments, was therefore included
in the equation.

Recognition of mutual interdependence and/or collusion by fi-rms

in an industry should allow the achievement of higher margins.

Theoretically,

then, higher levels or seller concentration through either increasing the degree
I

of interdependence or the effectiveness of co 11 us ion ( i . e. reducing the cost of
collusion) should result in higher profit margins.

The four~firm concentration

11

ratio (CR) was thus included in the profit equation.
An
implicit assumption
regarding
the published concentration ratios
.
.
.
.
'

is that markets are national in 'scope.

A number of industries, however, are

more properly classified as r,egional or local in nature.

In order to account

for ,di,fferences in the geographic differences in the dimensions of some
industries in a, sample~ a dumll\Y variable was constructed from infonnation
pre~ented b.Y Schwartzmen and Bodoff, [25] and Si_egfried and Grawe [26] to
distinguish regional and local markets~

The regional dummy (RD) was constructed,

to take the value of one if the industry were regional or local in nature; and
a value of zero other-wise.
Two market characteristics, price _elasticity of demand (EL) and growth
riite in output (GVS) were also_ included in_ the. profit equation . . Lower absolute
value of demand elasticity should result tn higher margins.
estimate·s of deman9 elasticity were not available.

Unfortunately

~-one_theless, within the

food processing 'sector, :SUffi ci ent data were available to ;make fodependent
_estimates of de~and elasticity. 9 The absolute values of the coefficents
obtained from the indepen'dent estimation of elasticities were then introduced
into the equation and are expected to be inversely related to margins.
Growth in output is expected to influence margins in a positive direction.
Growth in output is reflective of increases in product demand, decreases. in
cost conditfons, or some combination of the two.

Reduct\ons .in cost conditions

should lead direstly to greater margins, while increase in demand should ultimately
.

.

. :

.

.

.

do likewise, via j,ncreases in product prices or reductions in unit cost due to
improved ca_pacity utilization.

The growth variable was measured as the percentage

change in nominal value of shipments over the six year period preceeding the year
in which the margin was measured.

'

12

:'

Maintainable profit margins should also be higher in situatiorts where
barriers to entry, attributable to either advertising intensity or scrale
requirements exist.

The advertising to sales .ratio (Ad/S) and the economies

of scale dummy {ESD} variable were thus also entered into the profit equation
to account for potential barriers from the above sources.
Finally, profit m,argins are expected to be influenced by international
trade factors.

To account for potential import competition and exporting

activity the ratios of current imports and exports to domestic value of shipments

{M/S, X/S),were included in the equation. 10

'1

Therefore, the resulting profit equation and expected signs are:

{II.2) PMG = f

2

( CR, K/S, GVS, Ad/S, EL, RD, ESD; X/S, .M/S
?
+
+
+ +
+ +

)

'

The Advertising Equation
FolJowing the work of Schmalensee [24] and Commanor and Wilson [5],
the profit margin was included as a determinant of advertising intensity ..
If profits a ffei::t advertising in the manner the above mode 1s predict, it
is expected higher margins would ,ind~ce higher advertising intensity.
'

Seller concentration was also ,included in the advertising equation.
It is expected that concentration should exert a positive influence upon
advertising intensity be'cause focr~ases in market share allow

firms to

internalize a greater proportion of the industry-wide effects associated
with advertising.

Furthermore, in industries tending toward oligopoly,

advertising may become the main instrument of rivalry as opposed to price
competition.
The two market demand variables-growth in output and elasticity of
demand were also included in the advertising equation.

A positive association

I

.,

:I

I
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is expected between advertising and growth.

I

'

First, rapid growth often implies

the introduction of new prodt:1cts,_which, generaHy, ar:e heavily advertised~
Moreover, when demand is growing, profits are likely to be available to finance
further marketing and· advertising effort.
Since the. early work. of Dorfman and Steiner
.
. [8] it has been recogniz~d
.

.

·~

.

..

that advertising should be influenced by price elasticity of demand .. Their well
known resuJt for the monopoly
case,, implies that for any given relationship
··.
\

.

.

between advertising and its affect upon sales, the optimum advertising to sales

It is difficult,

ratio is invers~ly related to price elasticity of demand.

however, to·generalize.thfs· rule to market structures outside the pure monopoly
. model.
. '

For example, in cases other tha·11 monopoly, differences arise ·between
•..

.

.

'

an·

.

individual firm's demand elasticity and the market price elasticity.

Low market

price elasticity may or may not imply low individual firm elasticities.
Compounding the issue is the fact that the marginal returns from advertis,ing
may themselves depend upon _market elasticity of demand . . If, for instance,
market demand is already prke inelastic, then the marginal returns to
advertising may be low compared to cases where market demand is elastic.
For these reasons, the overa_l l di re ct ion of impact of demand· e 1as ti city on
advertising cannot be determined

~

priori .

A final variable in the advertising equation was a dummy designed to
distinguish consumer goods from producer goods industries (CPO).

Since consumer

'

goods appear to be more differentiable through advertising, and because
advertising, as opposed to direct sales, is likely to be a more effective
means of reaching potential buyers in these i ndus tries, it is expected that
advertising intensity would be higher in consumer goods industries.

The dummy

14

was constructed such that consumer goods industries were assigned a value of
one and producer goods industries a value of zero.

Delineation of consumer

and producer goods was based upon Ornstein's calculations [18]

of the percentag~

of industry output allocated to, final demand as opposed to intermediate sales. 11
Thus, the advertising equation and expected signs are:

(II.3) Ad/S = t 3 (CR, PMG, GVS, EL, CPD )
.
+ +
+
?
+
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III. MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
In the three equation model presented.earlier, advertising appears in both

i '.

the profit margin and concentration equations., cdncentration in the margin and
advertising equation, and margins in the advertising equation.

Thus it is

necessary to treat all three variables as endogeneous whose values are jointly
.

'

determined in the simultaneous equation system consisting of equations (II.1),

(II.2),

and

{II.3).

Each equation in the system, according to the order condition

.,
for identifiability, is over-id~ntified.

Moreover, the accounting relationship

!

I

between profit margins and advertising intensity results in contemporaneous
correlation of errors across equations.

Since the profit margin is measured

gross of advertising, transitor~ variations in advertis~ng are correlated with
profit margins.

Indeed, the correlation of errors across the two eqyations is
'

.49.

'

There.fore, the estimation procedure choosen was three-stage least squares

( 3SLS). 12

iI
\

The industry sample utilized in the estimation of the model consisted of the
,47 U.S. food processing industries defined by the Census at the four-digit level
of aggregration.

13

The time periods studied were the years 1967 and 1972.

The

food processing sector was· chosen primarily due to the constraint of identifying
an industry. group with sufficient
data to estimate price elasticities of demand.
'
'

Moreover, the food processing .sector. distinguishes itself not only in its
importance relative to total manufacturing activity, but also as an area of
current public concern.
The 3SLS estimation results for 1967 and 1972 are presented in Table 1.
The values in parentheses underneath each coefficient estimate are

It should be noted, of course, that the
procedure are only asymptotically valid.

11

11

t 11 values.

t 11 values generated from the 3SLS
With this in mind, it can be seen from

Table l that most coefficients appear statistically ~ignificant and conform in

. TABLE l

3SLS

=

REGRESSION RESULTS:· 1967 and 1972

(t - ratios in parentheses)
Dependent ConVariable· stant

"""'
CR

A'

·PMG

KR

K/S

A.

Ad/S

GVS

CPD

RD

EL

ESD

NF

X/S

M/S

1967

PMG

-fr.04
(. 795)

.303
(2.51)

.

2~02
(3.94)

.085
(2.12)

8.07
(2.08)

- . 111
{2. 13)

.537 · . .
(. 184)

4.62
{l.74)

.005
- • l 07 ·
{ . 060)
{1.34)

'

Ad/S . -2.89
( 1.42)
CR

- .003 .
• l 01
( 1.88) (. 187) ·

.055
(L98)

1.93
(2.58)

.006
{.322)

2.71
( 1. 72}

33.91
(11.14)

'

13.80
{3.75)

2.44
(3.20)

-.006
(3.59)

1972

PMG

-8.89
(. 928)

.418
(3.28)

Ad/S -4. 17
( l . 89)

.046
( 1. 60)

CR

5.67
(1.26}

.084
( 1.82)
.010 ·
(.678)

. 102
-(L65)

38.40
(12.35)

2.64

_ _ _ _ • ._ _ _ _ _

-

·-·--

•••

---·

~------·~-

7.03
( 2. 27)

1.41
(.462)

-·

-

- - - - ·-• -•-----.----·-~- - - - - - - - - - · · · - · - · • •

- .. ,-

-

--·-

.,

----

,.

---·----

--------

13. 99
(3.60)

-

,. _ _ _ _ _ _ _

·---

--------- ·---

- .181

-.041

(1 .76)

(.611)

· 2 .01
(2.45)

.001

( . 023)
1.78
(:2.08)

( 1. 53)

•• ··--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - · .

- ~ 136
(2.44)

1.14
{1-.86)

--

----------'

-----

--

---------

----/···--

-

••

---

~.010

( 4. 17)

· - - - - . -- ------------- ----

________ ,· __________

1 . -_

•

-.

-·

---····-·

i- .-._ --~-------
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Since the results fo.r .1967 and 1972 are similar,

s_ign to theoreti.cal expectation.

l

the interpretati9n. of the results will be limited to the 1967 estimates. 14
The ·_results· from the estimated model give .considerable support to the
hypothesized interrelationships and feedbaek effects between margins, concentration
and advertising.

For example, _the .results indicate that advertising intensity

does exert a significant affect upon profit ·margins, but a:t the same time higher
margins are seen to ...feedback and-exert
a statistically
significant. impact- on
.
'

-

'

'

'

,.

.

,

'

'

·.

advertistng•intensity. Similarly, concentration displays a statistically
significant effec:t on both profit margins and advertising intensity, while
h_igher advertising intensity results in significantly higher levels of concentration.
The value of the advertising coefficient in the margin equation is of particular
interest~

Since advertising ~xpenditures ar~ includ~d in the gross marg~n ; one

would expect that the coefficient for the advertising to sales ratio should
approach one, even if advertising yielded no barrier effect.·

The value of the

advertising coefficient turns out to be 2.02 and is .greater than one by slightly
.

.

more than two standard errors.

.

Taking this result in conjunction with the a.lready

noted significant effect of advertising on concentration. suggests that high
advertising intensity, at least within the food processing sector, does act as a
barrier to entry.

This result is in accordance with.that found by the FTC in a

much e·arlier study of the food sector [9], and lends further support to the
.

'

·importance of advertising and product differentiation in affecting concentration
in consumer ·goods industries as suggested by Mueller and Hamn [14].
Viewing each equation independently also· yields some interesting results.
Looking first at the margin equation, the most striking finding is the significance
'
of the market price elasticity of demand in affecting margins. Price elasticity
is, therefore, found to be an important structural variable affecting inter-.
industry diff_erentials· in price-cost margins.

The value of the estimated

· 18

coefficiemt for the elasticity variable implies that roughly a 10% decrease in
.

.

- demand el as ti city is ciSSOCi c!. ted ceteri s pari bus, with l % increase in prof1 t .
- margins.
regional

The concentration ratio, growth in demandil capital intensity, and the

market dummy also are significant in the profit equat,on and ·

- display the expected s_i gns.
The inclusion of the foreign trade variables, however, did not seem to
. add much in the profit equation".

The import share· variable, for example, is

not significant an_d displays an _unexpected positive sign,\ Contrary to. results
obtained in other studies of manufacturing industries_, this suggest that import
competHion has had ·-little impact in affecting profitability' of domestic ·firms.
The differing results found here: probably reflect some special aspects of the
•

r

'

•

•

U.S. foodprocessing sector.

Many industries wJthin the sector, for instance,
.

.

.

.

are highly protected via tariffs, quotas, and government inspection standards [33].
Thus, in many of the industries virtually no imports entered at all which
'

.

I -

apparently' rendered ·import competition ine;ffect~al in influencing domestic
profitsJ 5 The·r~sultsfo~ the export share variable were slightly better.
The_ exporting variable ;displays a negative sign and is marginally sigrdfi~ant
via a one~tail test~

Thus~ some limited support is provided to Caves• conjecture,
'

that expansion into export markets results in more competitive outcomes in the
domestfc market.
With regard to the advertising equation, again most of the variables are
.

.. .-

.

,

.

,

'.\,

.

significant and have coefficients with appropriate signs.
is ~een to increase·
Schmalensee [24].

in

Advertising intensity

response to hi_ gh·er profit margins as predicted by

Since profit margins are measured gross of advertising, the

coefficient on the margin· variable should not be interpreted as ·suggesting that
10 cent$ on every ·dollar of net profits (profits ~inus advertising expenditures)

is allocated to advertising.

Rather~ $ince the average advertising to sales

ratio for th-e sample.is approximately -2.9 percent, a more accurate ir{terpretation
would be that an incre11se in net profits of -$1 is associated with an increase in
advertising of about7 cents.
'

-The coefficient for the concentration ratio was positjve and s_ignificant
-

.

.

suggesting that incre<1se,s in industri concentration do result in. greater ·
.

'_

.

-

-

-

-

advertising intensity.

.

-

.

'

.

.

..

. .

/

.

Also, as expected advertising intensity was found to
.

.

be gr~ater in consumer as opposed to producer goods industries.

.

Finally,

neither growth in.demand, nor market price elasticity, had a significant
influence ,upon. advertising~· t

The last estimated relationship of the model was the concentration equation._
All variables in_ the equation are statistically significant and have the
hypothesized sfgns.

As expected concentration is found to be inversely- related

t-o the number of firms in the:industry.
to higher levels, of concentration.

Higher levels of advertising intensity lead

Evaluated at mean values, the coefficient -

for the adyertising to sales ratio suggests ·that a 10 percent increase in
advertising intensity is assodated with approximately a 1.6 percent increase·
in concentration.

Finally, concentration is found to be positively influenced

by _plant economies bf scale and capital requirements.

Various sources of·

barrie_rs to entry are thus s~en to_ be important in determining the level of
industry seller concentration.

(

l

I

"
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· J,V. ,CONqLUSIONS

Previous empirical studies of industrial· organiza.tion have tended to ignore
the simultaneous natur~ of -the relationships between profitability, advertistng
and-industry concentration.

This study has taken explicit account of this

simultaneity by specifying and estimating a siniult~neous equation -model. of
- .

-

p~ofits, advertising,.
and concentration.
The model was estimated- via three
.
.-

.

.

'

.

.

-

~

.

.

'

-- stage least squares utilizing
sector . for the
.
. . data' for the U.S. food processing
.
.

years 1967 and 1972.

.

,

.

-

In addition, the econometric irodel was designed to

include the·often omitted structural variables of-.price elasticity of demand
-

;

and international trade.
Several conclusions emerQe. from the study. : Th.e results of the
.

'

..

statistical estimation of the modf l indicate that, within U.S. fo.od processing
industries, seller concentration is an important structural variable in affecting
both the profitability and advertising intensity o.f indu~trfos.
.

.

.

.

'

Further~

.

advertising intensfty'apparently does constitute a barrier to entry which yields

both higher- profits and._higher levels of industry concentration.

At the same

time, h.i gher profits and conce11tr_ation seem to feedback and generate higher
.

.

degrees of advertising· intensity.
The results- for. the foreign trade variables indicate the limited role
of international trade in infllienci~g the competitive conditions in the U.S.
food processing sector.

Imp6rt competition appeared not to be sufficiently
:

strong to affect industry profitability.

r

Some evidence did; surface, however,

_that expansion of .markets through exporting has· lead to more competitive
domestic .results.

Finally, the }esults concerning market p:rice elasticity of

I

l-

21

demand confirmed the 1theoretical importance of this variable as an element
of market strocture.
In general; our results suggest that further analysis of the structure
conduct performance relationship should be c·ouched in\ terms of a simultaneous
equation framework, and further effort should be made in analyzing the role of
.

'

international trade and variations in demand elasticities for more comprehensive
i ndus_try ·samp 1es.

FOOTNOTES
*Fi nanci a,l support for this project was received from the Center for International
Studies at the University of Missouri - St. Louis..,

We are indebted to 1Angelos _

Pagoulatos -for helpful comments.

l.

A comprehensive survey of profitability studies can be found in Weiss [32].
For summaries of studies concerning the determinants of advertising and
·concentration see: , Ornstein [17, '18].

2o

A ~otable 1 exception is Comanor and Wilson [5].

3.

For a similar proof ~ee:

4.

An excellent survey of the various theories of the determinants,of

Saving [23] and C6wling [6, 7].

concentration can be found in Ornstein, et al, [17].
5.

The Commanor-Wilson measure of efficient pl;ant size can be calculated as .5
times the reciproca·1 of the number of largest pl ants required to account for
one half of industry output. - It is thus highly correlated with levels of
plant concentration.

Since plant concentration is highly correlated with
/

firm concentration, even in s'i tuations where lit tie or no variations exist
in relative scale economies,some spurious correlation occurs between
concentration and minimum efficient plant size.
6.

The data used to calculate concentration, number of fi nns and pl ant economies
of scale 1/jere obtained-from the Census of Manufactures [30].

Gross fixed

value of capital was obtained from the Annual Survey of Manufactures.

Finally,

the advertising to sales ratios are those presented by Ornstein [18] which
are- calculated from the U.S. Input-Output tables at the four-digit level of
aggregration.

7.

From Census data the margin is calculated as:

8.

The merits of the price-cost,margin as opposed to other profit measures
are more thoroughly discussed by Weiss [32].

value added - pgyroll - rentals
value of shipments

The severity of the aggregrati on

problem on food processing industries is discussed in Imel. and Helmberger [12].
9.

The variable denoting price elasticity of demand was obtained from
regression estimates of demand.equations for the industries in our sample.
For each industry category a consumer demand equation was estimated using
annual data for the 1952-75 period.

The only exceptions were the chewing

gum (1957-75) and soft drink (1960-75) industries where only a smaller
sample was available.

The general equation estimated was:

where:
..,,i'

Qi = an index bf per capita consumption of goods in industry i · (1967=100)
Pi = an i.ndex of retail prices for goods in industry i deflated by the
retail food price index (1967=100)
V = an index of disposable personal income per capita deflated by the
implicit GNP deflator (1967=100)
The estimated value of the price elasticity of demand was calculated as

.

"

EL 1 =a

1

. .

(p 1 /Q 1 ),

.

where ~ 1 and

.

Q1

are the mean values of the two variables.

Data for the above variables were obtained from various Department of
Agriculture [28] and Department of Labor [31] publications.

Our estimates

of demand elasticity were compared to estimates calculated by Brandow [l] and
George and King [10].

While their estimates for a number of cases did not

conform to our industry classification, the general impression is that our own
results are very similar to the·irs.

I

10. The values for import and export shares were obtained from [29].

A more

complete discussion of alternative measures of import competition and
exporting intensity ~re provided by P.agoulatos and Sorensen [19, 20].
ll. Utilizing data from the U.S. Input-Output Table, Ornstein considers
.industries which allocate 50% or more of their output to final demand
to constitute· consumer goods, while those allocating less than 50%
to be producer type goods.
,/

12. While two"".stage least squares could p,rovide consistent parameter

estimates,

the existence of ·contemporaneous correlation of errors across equa'tions
0

_ renders the two-stage estimates inefficient.

Improvements in efficiency can

be achieved ·under these circumstances with the three stage procedure. · For
. example, see Zellner and .Their. [34] and Madansky

[13].

13. The industries included in this $tudy (wjth .the 1972 S.I.C .. number in ·
.

.

parenthesis), are: 1) Meatpackfog (2011); .2) Sausages and other prepared
meats (2013}; 3) Poultry dressing (2016, 2017); 4) Creamery Butter (2021);
5) Cheese (2022); 6) Condensed and evaporated milk (2023); 7) Ice cream
and ices (2024); 8} Fluid milk (2026); 9) Canned specialities (2032); 10) Canned fruits and vegetables (2033); 11) Dried and dehydrated fruits and
vegetables (2034); 12) Pi,ckles, sauces and salad dressings (2035); 13) ·
Frozen fruits, vegetablesi and juices (2037, 2038); 14) Flour and other
grain mi 11 products (2041); 15) Cereal breakfast foods (2043); 16) Milled
rice and byproducts (2044); 17) Blended and prepared flour (2045); 18) Wet
corn milling (2046); 19) Pet .food (2047); ·20') Prepared feeds (2048);

21)

Bread and bakery products (2051); 22) Cookies and crackers (2052); 23) Raw
Cane sugar (2061); 24) Sugar refining(2062, 2063); 25) Confection~ry products
(2065); 26} Chocolate and cocoa.products (2066); 27) Chewing ~um (2067);
28) Cottonseed oil mills (2074); 29) soybean oil mills (2075); 30) vegetable

oil .mills (2076}.; 31) Animal and marine fats and oils (2077); 32) Shortening,
table oils and m~rgarine (2079); 33) Malt beverages (2082); 34).Malt (2083);
35) Wines, brandy and brandy spirits (2084); 36) Distilled liquor (2085);
37) Soft drinks (2086); 38) · Flavoring extracts and syrups (2087); 39) Canned
and cured seafood (2091); 40) Fresn or frozen packaged fish (2092); 41)
Roasted coffee (2095); 42) Manufactured ice {2097).; 43) Macaroni products
(2098); 44) Cigarettes (2111); 45) Cigars (2121); 46) Chewing and smoking
tobacco and snuff (2131); 47) Tobacco stemming and redrying (2141).
14. Because advertistng values are not yet available for 1972, the 1967 figures
were used in both years estimation.

. l

.

15. Our finding conforms to the results of a number of studies done for specific
industries within the food processing sector, such as Novakovic and Thompson

[16].

\
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